As the support brigades evolved they would begin to demonstrate their relevance in the modular force. It is the evolution of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, its demonstration of relevance and its quest for legitimacy that serves as the focus of this Strategic Research Project.
MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY
Less than two years after the devastating attacks upon America on September
11, 2001, the United States Army found itself in intense operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. These operations were clearly placing a heavy strain on the forces of the U.S. Army. 3 Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker was convinced these operations, as well as the demands of the Global War on Terror, required the U.S.
Army to dramatically change how the Army organized its forces. 4 In the fall of 2003
General Schoomaker ordered the U.S. Army, to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. 5 Under the lead of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Schoomaker directed the conversion be swift and to not become bogged down by utilizing the Army's more deliberate force development methods. 6 As the Army began efforts to overhaul its division-based structure, the chief of staff's guidance was clear. General Schoomaker believed the Army needed to become a more expeditionary force if it was to meet the demands of the current and future conflicts. 7 The new Army structure needed to be made up of smaller, more versatile formations, able to deploy promptly to meet specific combat requirements. 8 To date, the Army's shift from the long held division-based structure to a modular brigade-based structure has been challenging by many standards, arguably successful and clearly necessary to meet the operational requirements of the missions and threats facing the United States today. Dr. John Bonin stated, "This shift has made it easier for the Army to strategically tailor land forces to the combatant commander's full spectrum requirements." 9 Undertaking overarching transformation of the force, while concurrently waging war in two major theatres of operation; has stretched leadership, infrastructure and resourcing of the Army to edge of capability.
At the heart of the brigade-based structure, 
Modularity -Movement to the Brigade based Army
To fully understand the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), one must fundamentally understand the origins of modularity from which the MEB evolved. This section will briefly discuss the history of the modular force and the goals the Army intends to achieve through modularization.
With the end of the Cold War, the Army began to review its current force structure and to ask if that structure was capable of meeting the challenges of the pending 21 st Century. In the early 1990s the Army began to seriously discuss the concept of modularity. 10 In January 1995 TRADOC published a pamphlet outlining its Concept for Modularity. This pamphlet, TRADOC PAM 525-68, envisioned the future Army would deal with force strength constraints, dollar constraints, and limits on strategic lift required to transport forces and capability into theater. 11 Further discussion and experimentation continued through the 1990s and into the first decade of the twenty-first century. The move to the modular force required the Army to begin converting itself from its long held organizational structure centered on divisions.
Under the strong direction of Secretary Rumsfeld and the dedicated leadership of General Schoomaker, modularity was now on its way to transforming the Army. 19 Divisions which numbered in size from 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers would still exist, but the Army would become centered on brigades totaling at most 3,900 soldiers. 20 The move to the modular army became known as "modularity" and would prove to alter every echelon of the force from battalion to army in both the active and reserve component. 21 Through modularity, the Army intended to achieve increase combat power, increase the rotational pool of ready units, and reduce stress on the force by developing a predictable deployment cycle. 22 Further, the Army believed it would create an operating force that when deployed, would require less augmentation. 23 The Army maintained that by organizing around BCTs and Support Brigades it will be able to "better meet the challenges of the 21 st century security environment and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)." 24 As General Schoomaker led the transformation to the modular force, he was adamant that the transformation not be bogged down in the usual deliberate force development procedures. 25 To this end, General Schoomaker directed TRADOC to create an ad hoc group tasked to develop the modular force design and thus "Task Force Modularity" was stood up. 26 General Schoomaker's guidance to the task force was clear. The transformation process must be quick; accepting a certain level of risk, knowing problems would be worked out as the Army gained operational experience with the new design. 27 General Schoomaker set three goals that the initial modular brigade combat teams had to meet: First, they had to be as capable as current units. Second, they had to be easier to deploy than existing units. Finally, they had to be configured in a way that permitted the Army to transform without having an increase in manpower. 28 The task force utilized a force design they labeled as "units of action" as they struggled to design the new force. It was during the discussion on units of action that the concept of a "Protection Brigade" was first discussed. On September 21, 2005 the protection brigade was officially named the Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB-ME). Feeling a more precise designation for the brigade was the designation "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade", the designation was officially changed on November 7, 2007 29 The creation of the MEB resulted in a command that was a direct departure from the Army's long held tradition of organizing its force structure around specific branch or specialties. 30 The newly designed brigade was a multifunctional headquarters, with a staff possessing the expertise to command and control chemical, engineer, air defense and military police units. 31 Through augmentation of civil affairs, psychological operations, and combat service support forces, the MEB was capable of conducting security, stabilization and reconstruction operations. Yet further enhancing the capability of the MEB was the concept of assigning a tactical combat force (TCF) to the MEB to enhance the unit's capability of defensive maneuver and limited offensive maneuver. 33 As they disbanded, the transformed modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. 34 Over the next few years, doctrine struggled to catch up with and to keep pace with the already fielded and rapidly developing modular brigades. In addition to developing specific doctrine for each of the modular brigades, the Army published Field Appendix C, FM 3-0, clearly identifies the BCTs as the centerpiece for Army maneuver. 35 The BCTs are designed to serve as the basic building block of the Army's tactical formation. 36 BCTs when attached to a higher echelon headquarters such as a division, corps or theater army, will become part of a force-tailored formation designed to meet a specific operational requirement. Maneuver Support Battle Lab (MSBL), also at Fort Leonard Wood, to "develop and experiment with the MEB" concept. 45 To fully address the concept of the MEB, MANSCEN chose to establish a General Officer Working Group with the charter to refine the mission statement, propose employment concepts, and develop the organizational design of the MEB. 46 The Task Force Modularity concept of the protection brigade or MEB as it became known was in an effort to create a modular brigade capable of providing both functional support and reinforcing support to the BCTs. 47 The MEB as described in initial Army Doctrine was a command and control headquarters with a highly capable, multifunctional staff. The MEB's key capabilities were identified as; protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment functions. 48 The MEB is not designed to replace the functional Engineer, Military Police or Chemical brigades on the battlefield. Rather, the MEB is designed to provide an intermediate multifunctional capability to the division commander, capable of providing command and control for a limited number of assets from those specific branches.
When a mission requires a more functional approach or capability exceeds the MEB, selected functional missions are transferred to a functional brigade for execution. The MEB structure reduces the command and control footprint in the battle space by providing an economy of force through its multifunctional capability. From the inception of the protection brigade and still present today, is a discussion which centers on the depth of branch capability within the MEB. 49 This concern was shared by General
Schoomaker during the initial design phase of the MEB; however, reasoning that deferring such questions to when the Army actually established the unit seemed best, he approved the initial design. 50 The MEB shares many common characteristics with other support brigades in that it is tailorable, modular, expeditionary, networked, joint interdependent, agile and multifunctional. However, the MEB has no direct antecedent in today's force structure and unlike other support or functional brigades; the MEB is staffed and trained to
Command and Control (C2) an assigned area of operations (AO) and to control terrain. 51 "It is in this regard that the MEB is similar in nature to the BCT, but without the BCT's inherent maneuver capability." 52 Clearly, the MEB is designed to form a bridge between the capabilities found in the BCTs and the more robust capabilities found in the functional brigades.
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As the MEB continued to evolve and be tested, doctrine for the MEB also The MEBs deployed into theatre to date have clearly demonstrated the value of the MEBs multi-functional capability. It is this multi-functional command and control capability combined with correct subordinate unit alignments that will provide the division, corps and theatre commanders a flexible force capability to conduct full spectrum operations. 66 The MEB is well structured to perform in the numerous stability environments the Army finds itself operating in today. If properly augmented with TCF capability, the MEB will also perform well in limited counter-insurgency and counterterrorist environments found throughout the world today. The MEB should no longer be overlooked as a viable option to meet the tactical needs of today's operations. Over the past several years, the Army has worked to establish the CCMRF. This force is designed to be a "robust federal entry force that is scalable and task-organized to mitigate further loss of life and relieve suffering in response to a CBRNE disaster." 67 The CCMRF "supports local and state requests for assistance as part of a coordinated federal response" to a CBRNE disaster. It is important to recognize that the types of forces, equipment and experience required for response to a CBRNE incident are different than those required for a natural disaster. 73 CCMRFs have the expertise to provide support to domestic CBRNE consequence management missions of which the MEB has the potential to play a major role. 74 The concept of deploying active Army soldiers or National Guard soldiers in title 10 status within the United States boarders has been met with mixed reviews by those who do not fully understand the CCMRF mission. While many applaud the Department A second contributing factor to the MEBs lack of utilization appears to be the preponderance of MEBs assigned to the reserve component. Today, all but three of the existing MEBs in the Army are found in the National Guard and the Army Reserve. This lack of representation within the active Army force structure has resulted in a lack of exposure across the force. Division staffs and war planners at all levels are unfamiliar with the MEB and its capability and have failed to schedule the MEB for deployments into Iraq and Afghanistan. A continued failure to deploy the MEB formations into overseas contingency operations will result in a missed opportunity to validate the MEB capability and to utilize a highly capable organization uniquely tailored for today's stability operations. 80 Given the high number of the total MEB force structure found in the Army National Guard, the National Guard has been an active participant in the development of the MEB from its inception. From this participation, two relatively major philosophical differences arose between the National Guard and the active Army. These differences centered on the TCF concept and the rank structure of the command.
The Army National Guard is a strong advocate that the MEB should have a tactical combat force (TCF) assigned to the MEB in its organic structure. The addition of the TCF to the MEBs organic structure will insure the MEBs ability to conduct full spectrum operations at all times, not needing to depend on its ability to request and receive a TCF by attachment. Further, the organic TCF will foster a stronger command relationship and habitual training relationship. The organic TCF is seen as a critical component to the MEBs ability to perform stability operations in today's world.
The second philosophical difference centered on the rank structure of the MEB command. The Army National Guard advocated that the MEB should be commanded by a Brigadier General rather than by a Colonel. This discussion stemmed from early conceptual models of utilization of the MEB. Often times the conceptual models of the MEB were depicted in a linear battlefield concept in which the MEB was shown as the terrain owner of what had once been referred to as the Division Rear. Given that often times, the Division would detail one of its Brigadier Generals to C2 the Division Rear, bringing with it the rank and authority to influence all assets found in the rear, it seemed a natural conclusion for the MEB commander to hold that same rank and authority as well. Just as within the BCTs, the actual Table of It is essential that we continue to adjust the force where necessary to insure the Army arrives at 2017 with the correct unit formations in the Army's inventory.
In light of MEB utilization to date, it will be difficult for the Army to validate doctrine or to garner lessons learned concerning the employment of this modular support brigade and to fully assess the brigade's value to the total force. Army leadership and war planners must begin to recognize the dynamic capability of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigades and must begin to properly employ the MEBs in the fight if the MEB is to be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate its value within the total modular force.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are offered in part as a road ahead for the MEB. commands. 85 The Army should consider increasing the number of active component the justification for a TCF to be organic to the MEB structure is stronger than ever.
Although the MEB is clearly not a BCT, the MEB will be called upon to deal with threats within their area of operations that exceed the capability of the units habitually assigned to a MEB. The TCF is critical to the MEBs ability to shape and control their area of operations, especially in the unpredictable stability operations environment.
The recent employment of the 1 st MEB is a clear example of the full spectrum capability of a MEB when provided the TCF asset. The Division staffs and planners assigning battle space to the MEB must be confident that the MEB can fully control and execute its assigned missions. TCF capability is vital to the MEBs ability to execute that mission. When deployed, the MEB should be deployed with each of its organic assets. The MEB should continue to play a key role in the defense of our homeland;
however caution must utilized to not stove-pipe the MEB toward only conducting
Homeland Security type missions. The MEB is a highly capable combat asset and it should continue to be manned, resourced and allowed to develop its wartime capability. given by the Division Commander to a specific unit and is unaffected by the rank of the commander commanding the unit it has been given. The effectiveness of the terrain manager comes from the authority vested in them by the Division and the relationships they develop with the tenants of that terrain.
Conclusion
In 2003, as General Schoomaker set out to transform the Army to the modular force, his vision was clear. The Army must become more expeditionary if it is to meet the operational demands of the 21 st century. 90 General Schoomaker was adamant the transformation must be swift, not becoming bogged down in the normal force development channels. 91 To keep the process moving forward, the Army chief of staff stated that "nothing had to be perfect. In fact, he expected the initial versions to have weak points that could be fixed later as the Army conducted additional analysis and gained operational experience with the designs." 92 Today, the Army continues to conduct its analysis of the modular force and refine that structure based upon lessons learned. To date, the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade has not sufficiently been put to the test. The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade is a dynamic multi-functional formation that is at a critical point in its development. The MEB must resolve basic organizational questions, continue to define its role in support of Homeland Security and most importantly, be put into the fight, if it is to ever secure legitimacy and find its position among the other seven modular brigades of today's Army.
